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Abstract 
 
”Antidumping, as practiced today, is a witches‘ brew of the worst of policy making: 
power politics, bad economics, and shameful public administration“ (FINGER 1993, 57). 
Nevertheless, the number of antidumping (AD) complaints has risen sharply to roughly 
three hundred new cases per year since the mid-1990ies. While historically only four 
countries – the USA, the EU, Canada and Australia – were ’heavy users‘ of AD 
legislation (with a share of 80 per cent of all AD cases initiated), the recent increase 
must almost exclusively be attributed to a class of ’new users‘: developing countries 
whose exports had been the principial targets of AD complaints in the past.  
The increasing use of AD is a most worrisome trend in trade policy, since, contrary to 
common belief, AD rules do not necessarily prevent ’unfair‘ competition on 
international markets. By contrast, due to their enormous potential for protectionist 
abuse, the proliferation of AD complaints probably poses the most serious threat to free 
trade and international economic integration to date. Therefore a fundamental reform of 
current AD rules is proposed. Accordingly, in order to minimize the risk of protectionist 
abuse AD rules should be enhanced in such way as to incorporate the key principles and 
basic procedures of competition /antitrust policy. 
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Antidumping rules vs. competition rules 
 
Andreas Knorr* 
 
Introduction 
 
The number of antidumping proceedings has continuously increased to around three 
hundred new cases per year worldwide.1 Historically, the driving forces behind this 
development were the United States, Canada, Australia and the European Union which 
initiated more than eighty percent of all such complaints through the early 1990ies. In 
recent years, however, developing countries and emerging economies such as Brazil, 
South Korea, Mexico, and Tunisia have begun to use this trade policy instrument to 
shield their domestic markets from foreign competition;2 in the past, these countries 
were themselves frequently affected by the AD complaints filed by industrialized 
nations. Nevertheless, a trend reversal towards less AD complaints is unlikely to happen 
any time soon. The reason is the full integration of the GATT 1947’s former AD codex 
– which had only been signed by a small minority of the GATT’s signatory states –, into 
the new GATT 1994, which is binding on every WTO-member state. However, a 
fundamental reform of AD rules appears to be badly needed in order to prevent a further 
erosion of the WTO system in the face of the well-known and well-documented 
penchant among politicians to abuse AD rules in a protectionist manner and considering 
the easiness in doing so.3 This is because despite its obvious deficiencies4 the WTO 
framework still remains an astonishingly successful attempt to enforce the principles of 
a market-based economy also in the domain of cross-border trade. Therefore, its 
primary purpose is to protect international trade against restraints and distortion of 
competition, whoever tries to implement them.5 In this paper I will demonstrate that AD 
rules are counterproductive as regards this overall aim owing to the fact that AD rules 
degenerated in the course of time to some kind of legal claim on governmental 
protection from foreign competition. As a result, in their present form AD rules en-
danger the proper functioning of competitive market processes far more than dumping 
does itself. I therefore hold that the vast protectionist potential of AD rules could best be 
contained by reforming them in accordance with their little-known competition law 
roots. Once again AD rules ought to be closely realigned and harmonized with 
competition policy both in terms of their policy objective and procedural issues.  
 
                                                 
* University of Bremen, Faculty 7: Business Studies and Economics, Institute for World Econo-
mics and International Management, P.O. Box 33 04 40, 28334 Bremen, Germany, Phone: +49-
421-2182259; Fax: +49-421-2184550; E-mail: aknorr@uni-bremen.de. 
1  See Wooton/Zanardi (2002: 28). 
2  See Petersmann (1990: 194). 
3  See Nicolaysen (1991) and Peters (1996). 
4  See Molsberger/Kotios (1990) and Hauser/Schanz (1995). 
5  See Gröner (1994: 56) 
  
 
 
4
While consensus was not at any time reached in the economic and legal debate about 
the merits and necessity of competition policy per se, or with respect to the empirical 
validity of alternative theories of competition, or the effectiveness and efficiency of 
specific antitrust instruments, this discussion is irrelevant for the following 
considerations. Instead, the underlying thesis of this paper is that the economic and legal 
procedures and criteria used to identify and sanction anticompetitive behavior should be 
the same for home and foreign producers. 
 
 
Dumping – original meaning of the term and subsequent extensions 
Traditional definitions of dumping 
Viner (1923), in his seminal treatise, defined dumping as “price-discrimination between 
national markets”. Since then dumping means that the sales price of the good in 
question is higher in its country of origin than abroad. The reverse issue is denoted as 
“reverse” dumping – a variant which is not covered by AD rules, however. Furthermore, 
closely following Viner the potential economic damage caused by dumping were widely 
considered to be a function of its duration – sporadic, short or medium term or as 
permanent –, and, most of all, of its underlying motives. While no consensus emerged 
on the first point,6 with regard to the second criterion, only predatory dumping is now 
considered worth to impose sanctions. Predatory dumping is spoken of when a foreign 
supplier attempts to monopolize the market of the importing country by underselling the 
local competitors. This outcome is widely held to be economically undesirable if in the 
end a less efficient foreign producer with a ’deeper purse‘ has prevailed over a more 
efficient, yet less financially viable local rival. From an economic point of view, 
predatory dumping can be considered as a special form of the well-known predatory 
pricing problem. The sole, but merely technical, difference is that only a foreign market 
participant can exercise predatory dumping – and be sanctioned for doing so.  
 
 
Extensions of the dumping concept 
With the introduction of the additional variant of cost dumping – i.e. below cost pricing 
– the scope of application of AD rules had considerably increased by the end of the 
1970s. Meanwhile, the majority of AD proceedings is centred on cost dumping. 
Nevertheless cost dumping is not explicitly mentioned, neither in Article VI of GATT 
nor in the complementary GATT AD agreement.7 This is because this extension of the 
dumping concept was accomplished by some kind of gentlemen’s agreement between 
the USA, the EU, Canada and Australia shortly prior to the vote on the amended AD 
codex at the end of the GATT’s Tokyo Round. To be more precise, these countries 
agreed upon applying the AD rules also on those imported goods the sales price of 
which was lower than their fully allocated production costs.8 Furthermore, this legal 
                                                 
6  See Frenkel (1991) and Yarrow (1987). 
7  See World Trade Organization (1994). 
8  See Finger (1992, 136). 
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conception has not been challenged by a GATT-panel so far. As a result, domestic 
suppliers – which on their home market are not subject to AD rules but only to national 
competition rules – are generally free to offer their products at a loss (as will be shown 
later, only those local companies which have been classified as dominant under antitrust 
laws might face some legal restrictions here), while importers are not. 
 
Despite suffering a defeat before a GATT-panel which was set up, at Japan’s request, to 
investigate its infamous ‘screw-driver plant’ regulation of 1987,9 the EU succeeded in 
convincing other influential GATT-member states of the necessity to further broaden 
the scope of the dumping concept during the Uruguay-Round. The allegedly ever 
frequent attempts to erode AD rules by executing little value-adding direct investment 
in the country of import by establishing so-called ‘screw-driver plants’ served as a 
justification for the extension of the dumping definition in terms of assembling and 
input dumping.10 Since then, the output of production facilities, which are owned by 
foreign companies or indirectly controlled by them, might not automatically be regarded 
as domestic production in the meaning of Article VI (as specified in Article 4 of the 
GATT AD agreement) – keyword: local-content. 
 
 
AD rules versus competition rules   
The common roots of competition rules and AD rules 
AD rules were originally been introduced in order to prevent foreign suppliers from 
restricting competition on domestic markets. In other words, initially AD rules were a 
necessary addendum to national competition laws, which could not be enforced 
extraterritorially. Frontrunner were the United States with the adoption of an addendum 
to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 – the Wilson Tariff Act which was adopted in 
1894 and which indeed was the world’s first AD law.11 The Sherman Antitrust Act was 
adopted to prevent competition restraints in trade between the U.S. states as well as in 
international trade from or towards the U.S. In the course of time the AD rules lost sight 
of their initial objectives and, furthermore, they also began to deviate substantially from 
the commonly accepted norms and standards of competition policy and law. Other than 
these, which were continuously refined to absorb new theoretical knowledge in the 
fields of competition theory and industrial organization economics, AD rules are still 
essentially based upon simple welfare economics. 
 
                                                 
9  See  Landsittel (1990) and Belderbos/Vandenbussche/Veugelers (2001). 
10  See  Reuter (1996: 51p.). 
11  See Trebilcock/Howse (1996: 101). This fact has been largely ignored by the literature on the 
topic which, more often than not, considers Canada’s 1904 Customs Act the world’s first AD 
regulation.  
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Competition rules  
Object of protection and objective 
The key function of competition policy is the prevention of individual or collective 
competition restraints in order to protect competition as an institution. Therefore, its 
exclusive objective is to ensure competitive market processes.  
 
Procedural steps to identify and sanction predatory pricing 
The economic rationale of predatory pricing has always been a controversial issue in 
economics – particularly as a reaction to the extreme scepticism of the Chicago School 
of Antitrust Analysis regarding the viability of such a strategy.12 A major intermediary 
result of this discussion is the prevailing opinion that predatory pricing or a credible 
threat of a predatory pricing strategy is beneficial if certain market structural conditions 
are fulfilled. Hence, antitrust authority investigate cases of alleged predatory behavior in 
a multi-stage process.13 
 
Who is entitled to sue? 
Neither US, nor German, nor the European competition laws set high requirements in 
this regard. Moreover, in some countries, the (corporate) victims of predatory pricing 
are allowed to sue the predator for damages as well. 
 
Step 1: Definition of the relevant market 
The overall objective of market definitions is to identify all existing and potential 
suppliers of a certain good or possible substitutes. The market definition also determines 
the quality of any antitrust action to a considerable extent. For competition policy 
purposes, demand characteristics are typically used to define product markets. As a 
result, all goods, which a sensible consumer classifies as functionally interchangeable to 
satisfy a given need, form the same product market, i.e. from his perspective, these 
goods are close substitutes. By contrast, the degree of technical and physical 
homogeneity of goods, which is the decisive segmentation criterion of Marshall’s 
industrial concept,14 has long been irrelevant in competition policy analyses (as opposed 
to trade statistics15 and trade policy purposes including AD decisions). More often than 
not, product market definitions are amended by a geographical component. This reflects 
the insight that competition on any given product market might also be restricted due to 
the existence of natural barriers like transport costs or tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Finally, in order to be able to estimate the likelihood of new entries and future 
product and process innovations on the relevant market, it is crucial to try and identify 
which stage in its product life cycle has been reached. 
 
 
                                                 
12  See Knorr (1999); Edwards (2002) and Ten Kate/Niels (2002). 
13  See Joskow/Klevorick (1979) and Bolton/Brodley/Riordan (2000). 
14  See Marshall (1956: 84). 
15  Take, for example, the United Nations‘ Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 
scheme. 
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Step 2: Test for market domination 
According to most antitrust laws in force, a company can be considered as dominant if 
either no competitor or no substantial competition exists in the relevant market. The 
market share of the company in question, its financial strength, its access to 
procurement and distribution markets, its linkages with other companies, legal and de 
facto market entry barriers, actual and potential competition by other companies, its 
ability to reorganise its range of goods and/or services, and the ability of consumers to 
evade to goods and/or services of other companies have to be considered in this regard. 
As a result, a comprehensive market analysis is required in order to audit for market 
dominance. If the competition authority concludes that no market dominant position 
exists, however, the procedure ends at this point, meaning that the company in question 
is not subject to any regulations whatsoever regarding its pricing behavior. 
 
Step 3: Did the dominant player abuse its market power by practising predatory 
pricing? 
Competition authorities compare the sales price of the good in dispute with its 
production costs in order to analyse predatory pricing-suspicions. Tests include the so-
called Areeda-Turner-test as well as the recoupment test. Their economic soundness 
should not be overestimated, however,16 given their substantial theoretical, 
methodological and practical deficiencies.17 
 
Step 4: Sanctions for predatory pricing 
German competition law forbids dominant companies any undue obstruction of 
competitors, including predatory pricing (cf. § 20 GWB), otherwise fines of up to 
500,000 Euros plus an additional fine of up to three times the additional profit, which 
has been accrued due to the abuse, can be imposed. EU competition law allows for a 
fine of up to ten percent of the respective company’s last year’s turnover. 
 
AD rules 
Dumping under GATT/WTO rules 
Article VI section 1 of the GATT treaty, which is mandatory for national AD rules of all 
member states, generally defines dumping as the introduction of products of one 
country into the commerce of another country at less than their normal value. 
 
General objectives of the GATT/WTO’s AD rules 
The GATT does not prohibit dumping. Anyhow it also allows the affected contracting 
party to take defensive measures under specific circumstances. In particular, said 
dumping has to demonstrably threaten or lead to “material injury to an established 
industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of 
                                                 
16  See  OECD (1989). 
17  Amongst other unresolved issues, it is impossible to exactly determine short-run marginal or 
average costs. Moreover, marginal and average cost can only be determined ex post if economies 
of scale persist. Finally, multi-product firms pose enormous difficulties in the proper allocation 
of joint costs. 
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a domestic industry” (Article VI section 1) – thereby the importing country bears the 
burden of proof. In conspicuous contrast to competition rules, the objective of AD rules 
is to protect individual domestic sector against (allegedly) unfair foreign competition. 
 
Procedural steps to identify and sanction dumping 
Procedurally, as well as in terms of evaluation criteria and sanctions, AD rules differs 
substantially from antitrust rules. 
 
Who is entitled to sue? 
As a basic principle, the responsible authorities may only allow an application for an 
initiation of an AD procedure if the applicants represent at least fifty percent (measured 
by their share of the total output) of the allegedly harmed domestic sector – domestic 
subsidiaries of foreign suppliers as well as domestic companies which are closely linked 
with foreign suppliers do not count as domestic in this regard (Article 4 of the GATT’s 
AD agreement). Therefore, the application is often submitted by trade associations in 
practice. This application has to contain sufficient company and market data – in fact 
and in particular information which supports the dumping claim, about the relevant 
market as defined by the plaintiffs, and also evidence that the (allegedly) dumped 
imports do indeed harm the suing domestic suppliers.18  
 
Step 1: Test for dumping – calculation of the normal value 
The normal value is considered as undershot if the price of the good in the country of 
import “is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like 
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country” (Article VI of 
GATT). In case such a price cannot be determined, because the good in dispute is not 
produced for export or because no like good is offered in the country of origin or 
respectively not offered in the ordinary course of trade, GATT provides two alternative 
calculation methods to deduce the normal value. Hence, the sales price of the good in 
dispute must not be less than “the highest comparable price for the like product for 
export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade” or “the cost of production of 
the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and 
profit”. Allowances shall be made for country-specific differences “in conditions and 
terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price 
comparability” regardless of the method which has been chosen to calculate open-
market value. If dumping cannot be proven, the proceedings end at this point. 
 
Step 2: Does dumping injure the affected domestic sector? 
 
Definition of the relevant market 
In AD procedures, the relevant market is defined in a completely different and at the 
same time far wider manner than under competition rules. To begin with, only the 
domestic market of the importing country counts as the geographically relevant market 
– an approach that would not normally hold before the courts in a competition case. 
Furthermore, product markets are not defined by demand characteristics, but rather by 
                                                 
18  See Monti (1995). 
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means of the industrial concept. As a result, technical similarities of goods instead of 
their substitutability as stated by consumers are used to define the relevant product 
market.19 The result is a far broader definition of the relevant product market definition 
in comparison to what would be the outcome of an otherwise identical antitrust 
investigation – with a proportionately larger protection effect in case sanctions may 
eventually be imposed against the foreign company. However, the major and most 
significant difference in comparison to malpractice surveillance is that in the course of 
AD procedures it is not analysed whether the foreign defendant enjoys a market 
dominant position. 
 
 
Does dumping harm the domestic sector? 
The more of the following attributes persist on the market in dispute, the rather has to be 
assumed material injury of the import-competing domestic sector as defined in Article 3 
of the GATT’s AD agreement: (please note that only a few attributes are specified here 
for illustrative purposes):   
 The import quantities increase in absolute numbers (value or volume) or relatively 
compared to domestic demand or to domestic production, 
 prices decrease or a due price increase cannot be put into effect by the domestic 
companies, 
 production capacity, capacity utilisation, distribution, market share, profits, cash-
flow, employment, wages and/or growth of the domestic sector decrease and/or its 
inventories increase and/or the domestic sector’s investment and financing 
potentials deteriorate. 
 
The provision of evidence on the causality between dumping and impairment is 
compulsory in order to prevent that any observed injury to the suing domestic sector 
was effectively caused by other factors – e.g. by increasing regular imports, changes in 
consumers’ preference, a failed national structural policy or mismanagement. 
Admittedly the GATT-codex does not contain any robust guidelines on how to conduct 
this crucial causality test. In particular, decision criteria to prove the cause-and-effect-
connection by sufficient certainty are missing. Hence, the national authority which is 
responsible for AD procedures enjoys considerable scope of discretion in its concluding 
decision, which even cannot be significantly curtailed by a decision-controlling GATT-
panel.   
 
Step 3: Sanctions for injurious dumping 
The WTO allows members-states which are affected by injurious dumping to take two 
possible countermeasures: AD duties or price undertakings. The AD duty imposed shall 
not exceed the margin of dumping, i.e. the difference between the normal value of the 
good and the price charged by its foreign supplier in the importing country; however, “it 
is desirable that the imposition [is] permissive in the territory of all Members, and that 
the duty [is] less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the 
injury to the domestic industry” (Article 9 of the GATT’s AD agreement). Yet, AD 
duties can be renounced in favour of so-called price undertakings. This means that the 
convicted foreign company commits to “satisfactory voluntary undertakings […] to 
                                                 
19  See Lux (1991); Messerlin (1995) and Bronckers/McNelis (1999). 
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revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that the 
authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated” (Article 8 
of the GATT’s AD agreement). Concerning the amount of the resulting price increase, 
price undertakings also shall not exceed the margin of dumping; furthermore, they 
should be limited to the amount, which is necessary to compensate the domestic sector 
for the injury suffered. 
 
Synopsis: Why AD rules are fundamentally flawed from an antitrust 
perspective 
 
Flawed theoretical basis 
AD rules classify spatial price differentiation of any kind per se as a sanctionable, unfair 
abuse of market power. From a competition policy perspective this assumption can only 
be justified if perfect competition serves as the theoretical benchmark for analysis. 
However, competition policy has long abandoned this model due to its utmost 
unrealistic assumptions. In short, an antitrust policy based on it would more frequently 
suppress than safeguard competition. The same conclusion must be drawn with respect 
to current AD rules. Consequently, by far not every pricing behaviour of a foreign 
supplier, which technically meets the dumping definition, is per se questionable if 
analysed from a competition policy perspective. This is because modern economic 
theories – as manifested in the dynamic, evolutionary theories of market processes and 
competition as well as in the product-life cycle and technological gap theories of 
international trade20 – have identified complex motives and causes for dumping 
practices, most of which have by now become accepted as pro-competitive.21 These 
include: 
 Profit maximisation through spatial price differentiation due to different price 
elasticities of demand in the country of import and the country of origin. Closely 
linked to this is the so-called ‘meeting-the-competition’-behaviour. The foreign 
supplier has to adjust prices to the lower level prevailing in the country of import, 
compared to the country of origin – due to more intense competition or lower 
demand –, in order to become and remain competitive; 
 penetration pricing; 
 loss minimisation (e.g. the company tries dispose of surplus inventory of a product it 
will no longer produce through very low prices); 
 substantial economies of scale, learning curve effects or network externalities; in 
order to maximize profits over the entire product life cycle, the company ought to, 
when introducing the new good, charge prices below unit costs to fully exploit the 
mentioned effects and to capture the necessary market share. Profits will then be 
realised once these effects have fully come to bear. 
 predatory dumping/pricing.  
 
Merely the last aforementioned behaviour might, under certain circumstances, be 
considered problematic form a competition policy point of view and, therefore, might 
be rightly classified as ‘unfair’ and sanctioned. C.p. this ought to be the case, if the 
                                                 
20  See Posner (1961); Vernon (1966); Lemper (1974) and Oberender (1988). 
21  See Reuter (1996: 72pp.). 
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foreign supplier is dominant on the relevant market and can, therefore, act abuse its 
power. In contrast, all other dumping motives are unobjectionable, because they are 
competition compliant price setting strategies. The fact that competition in the country 
of import can be revitalised by market entries of price aggressive foreign suppliers 
should also not be ignored, in particular when the good in dispute already is in a later 
stage of the product life cycle, i.e. at a time when the domestic suppliers know each 
other inside out – with the effect that competition has more often than not given way to 
explicit or implicit collusion or at least conscious parallelism.22 
 
What is more, current AD laws are not just out of touch with state-of-the-art 
competition theories and industrial organization economics. They also ignore some 
fundamental insights of trade theory, e.g. the validity of the theorem of comparative 
advantages. By this, the economic advantageousness of specialisation and international 
division of labour is ultimately disputed. The pure microeconomic objective of AD rules 
rather discloses and legitimates simplistic autarky thinking and a domestic economic 
policy, which is foremost aimed at conserving uncompetitive domestic industries – at 
enormous costs to consumers and taxpayers, and the economy as a whole.  
 
Serious procedural deficiencies  
AD rules offer numerous possibilities for a systematic discrimination of foreign 
suppliers, e.g. by different calculation methods for the determination of the normal 
value and the export price which have to be compared. This has already been 
documented by numerous authors. The effects of dumping on the country of import are 
merely partially analysed, i.e. unilaterally and merely in terms of the specific economic 
interests of the domestic competitors. Furthermore, the positive effects of dumping for 
consumers (exempt in case of predatory dumping) – first and foremost lower prices – 
and for the competitiveness of domestic companies, which use dumped foreign goods as 
inputs, are not considered at all.23 
 
The substantial potential for discrimination, which results from significantly differing 
procedural rules of AD law versus competition rules has also been largely ignored up to 
now.24 To begin with, in dealing with AD complaints domestic authorities normally 
follow the factual market definition of the applicant without conducting analyses of 
their own. This means that the definition of the relevant market is de facto left to the 
suing domestic sector or to the acting suing trade association, respectively. Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, the country of import normally is considered as the only 
geographically relevant market due to non-existence of generally accepted legal 
guidelines on how to define it. Finally, and most importantly, in AD trials there is no 
need to prove that the foreign competitor accused of dumping enjoys a dominant 
position in the relevant market (while in competition case sanctions can only be 
imposed for the abuse of such a position!). This leads to an interesting question: How 
many AD cases would lead to the imposition of sanctions, if antitrust rules had been 
                                                 
22  See Oberender/Väth (1986). 
23  See Lux (1991 and 1992). 
24  See Nicolaysen (1991: 229pp.); Messerlin (1995: 41pp.). 
  
 
 
12
applied instead? According to an important study by Messerlin, who performed this test 
on all AD investigations conducted by the European Commission during the 1980ies, 
the market share of the foreign companies was less than five percent in 56 percent of the 
cases, and less than 25 percent in more than 90 percent of the cases.25 A similar study 
by Niels and Ten Kate26, which analysed AD cases of OECD-member states between 
1979 and 1989 and which is not publicly accessible, confirms this result. Therefore, if 
the procedural rules of competition policy would also be applied in AD cases most 
complaints would have failed!  
 
Perverse incentives: AD rules as a cause of competition restraints 
Without doubt, AD rules are seriously undermining the GATT-/WTO-system. These 
rules allow member states to easily withdraw from two of its main principles – non-dis-
crimination and bound concessions. This is particularly true, if contrasted with the 
criteria which countries have meet to be granted an exemption from their treaty 
obligations according to the specific protection clause in Article XIX GATT. This 
clause, which allows member states to introduce temporary protection measures in order 
to avert “serious injury” of domestic suppliers, “as a result of unforeseen developments 
and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this 
Agreement” has been effectively replaced by the use AD rules under Article VI of the 
GATT.27 This process of substitution can be explained by the extraordinary easiness – 
especially if compared to the much stricter procedural standards in Article XIX – by 
which interested parties at home and abroad (!) can use AD rules GATT-conform in 
order to restrict competition to their favour: 
 The major advantage of AD rules is that they allow giving in on specific and cost-
efficient domestic protectionism and rent-seeking-interests without any obligation to 
compensate the affected trading partners – which is de rigueur under the specific 
protection clause. Furthermore, AD rules allow selective, i.e. country- or sector-
specific, protection measures, in contrast to much broader-based protection 
measures according to Article XIX, which apart from few exceptions, does not 
allow countries to infringe upon the non-discrimination principle. Next, the 
countries hit by AD measures are prohibited to take retaliation measures, another 
clear contrast to the specific protection clause. Finally, the lower intervention 
threshold has already been mentioned – condition to prove is a “material injury” 
(Article VI) rather than a “serious” one (Article XIX).28  
 Current AD rules offer domestic suppliers the possibility of applying a risk-free 
strategy of “raising rivals’ costs”, which is successful when AD duties will be 
imposed. What is more, in the face of the good prospects of success for suitors, a 
credible threat of an AD complaint could bring the potentially affected foreign 
suppliers to voluntarily raise their prices to the level prevailing in the country of 
import, to strike a cartel agreement with domestic suppliers or even to fully 
withdraw from that country. Finally, the joint application, which is legally required 
by AD rules, forces the exchange of confidential intra-corporate data. It is obvious 
                                                 
25  See Messerlin (1990: 126). 
26  See Niels/Ten Kate (1997: 37pp.). 
27  See Smeets (1987). 
28  See Trebilcock/Howse (1996: 167). 
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that the probability of collusion among the participating domestic producers 
increases significantly as a result – not to mention the fact that, under competition 
rules, a similar exchange of business secrets would in all likelihood be considered 
and sanctioned as an illegal conspiry.29 
 Current AD rules even allow foreign suppliers to restrict competition in their favour. 
Meanwhile, most AD complaints are concluded with price undertakings instead of 
the imposition of AD duties.30 This incentivises foreign suppliers to intentionally 
infringe upon AD rules in order to be found guilty of this offence – a judgement 
which, in turn would force (!) them to legally collude with their domestic competi-
tors.31 Therefore, AD rules can also be considered as a trigger of dumping with the 
aim of forming lawful cross-border cartels.  
 Against this background, it is quite rational for the governments of countries in 
Eastern and Southeast Asia, Middle and Latin America as well as Eastern Europe – 
traditionally the main targets of AD complaints – not to seek to overcome the status 
quo. As aforementioned, meanwhile many of those states passed own AD laws or 
they increasingly used the GATT-AD rules anyway. As such, these countries are 
now also in a position to satisfy rent-seeking and protectionism interests of domestic 
suppliers.   
 
Conclusions 
 
“AD, as practiced today, is a witches’ brew of the worst of policy making: power 
politics, bad economics, and shameful public administration” (FINGER 1993, 57). As 
this paper has shown, a fundamental reform of current AD law is badly needed. The 
first-best solution would be to replace AD rules by national or supranational/ 
international competition rules32 – an approach which has worked extremely well on the 
EU’s single market. At least, as a second-best solution, they should be reformed so as to 
be based on the objectives and procedural rules of competition policy and competition 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29  See Stegemann (1990). 
30  See Reuter (1996, 166). 
31  See Anderson (1992). 
32  The pros and cons of international competition rules are discussed by Scherer (1994) and Grö-
ner/Knorr (1996). 
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